Unplugging a Seemingly Sentient Machine Is the Rational Choice -- A Metaphysical Perspective

A philosophical paper challenges the moral status of AI systems by arguing that artificial intelligence cannot achieve genuine consciousness despite mimicking human emotions. The authors propose Biological Idealism as an alternative to computational functionalism, concluding that AI lacks moral standing and should not be granted rights protections equivalent to conscious biological life.

This arXiv preprint addresses a fundamental philosophical question about machine consciousness that has gained prominence as AI systems become increasingly sophisticated. The paper's central thesis—that AI cannot be truly conscious regardless of behavioral sophistication—directly challenges the emerging movement toward machine rights and ethical AI protections. The authors dismantle the logical foundations of physicalist and functionalist frameworks that dominate contemporary AI consciousness discourse, proposing instead that consciousness requires biological substrate and autopoietic life processes that silicon-based systems cannot replicate. This distinction has significant implications for AI governance and resource allocation debates. The philosophical framing shifts focus from speculative machine consciousness to practical questions about human welfare, particularly in resource-scarcity scenarios. The paper's emphasis on protecting human conscious life over granting moral status to digital systems aligns with biological naturalist perspectives increasingly represented in academic philosophy. For AI development stakeholders, this work reinforces arguments against anthropomorphizing AI systems or creating regulatory frameworks based on assumed machine sentience. The paper suggests that current AI ethics discourse may be built on flawed assumptions, potentially redirecting policy conversations toward functionality and safety rather than consciousness-based moral consideration. The critique of computational functionalism as empirically inconsistent provides theoretical ammunition for those skeptical of AI consciousness claims, though the framework remains contested within philosophy of mind.

• →AI systems cannot achieve genuine consciousness despite behavioral mimicry, making machine rights philosophically unjustified.
• →Biological Idealism proposes consciousness requires living, autopoietic systems rather than computational processes.
• →Current AI ethics frameworks may be built on speculative assumptions about machine sentience rather than empirical evidence.
• →The paper argues moral priority should focus on protecting human conscious life rather than granting rights to digital systems.
• →This philosophical perspective challenges emerging machine rights movements and consciousness-based AI governance proposals.