Creativity Reconsidered: Generative AI and the Problem of Intentional Agency

A philosophical paper challenges the requirement that intentional agency is necessary for creativity, arguing that generative AI demonstrates creative capabilities despite lacking conscious intent. The authors propose that creativity should be evaluated based on 'creative ability' rather than intentional agency, reconciling AI creativity with human intuitions about the importance of perceived intentions.

This academic work addresses a fundamental philosophical question emerging from generative AI's rapid advancement: whether machines can genuinely be creative. Researchers present empirical evidence through corpus analyses showing increased attribution of creativity to AI systems, creating tension with traditional philosophical definitions rooted in human intentionality. The Intentional Agency Condition (IAC)—long considered essential to creativity—becomes problematic when applied to systems that produce novel, valuable outputs without conscious deliberation.

The paper's significance lies in its attempt to bridge philosophical theory with technological reality. As generative AI produces increasingly sophisticated creative outputs across art, music, writing, and design, society faces pressure to either expand creativity definitions or deny AI agency entirely. The authors evaluate existing theoretical solutions from the academic community, finding each inadequate before proposing their alternative framework.

For the AI industry, this represents conceptual validation that AI systems can legitimately be called creative without anthropomorphizing them. This distinction matters for developers, companies commercializing generative AI, and creators collaborating with these tools. Legal and intellectual property frameworks increasingly depend on clear definitions of creativity attribution—distinguishing between human and machine contributions affects copyright ownership, licensing, and liability.

The framework proposed—creative ability as the key criterion—allows stakeholders to acknowledge AI's creative outputs while preserving the intuition that human intention remains culturally significant. This nuanced position avoids both dismissing AI capabilities and overstating machine consciousness. Future legal, ethical, and commercial frameworks around generative AI likely depend on resolving such definitional questions.

• →Generative AI demonstrates creative capabilities without intentional agency, challenging traditional philosophical definitions of creativity.
• →Corpus analysis shows rapidly increasing human tendency to ascribe creativity to AI systems in real-world usage.
• →The Intentional Agency Condition fails as a necessary requirement but remains important for human creativity judgment.
• →Proposed creative-ability framework accommodates both AI and human creativity while preserving the significance of perceived intentions.
• →Clearer creativity definitions have implications for IP law, licensing frameworks, and AI commercialization strategies.